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Global Counterterrorism Forum 
The Politics of Counterterrorism and Compliance 
 
In 2011, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) was launched, aimed at providing an 
informal, a-political, multilateral counterterrorism platform to address 21st century terrorism. 
This forum was initiated by the United States. However, some of its members, including 
Russia and Qatar, have a disputable reputation with regard to counterterrorism and interests 
that are in contrast to those of the United States. This research helps understanding why 
states comply with the GCTF, despite having opposing interests. Furthermore, it provides 
important insights in the relatively new and underresearched topic of the GCTF. By 
conducting document analysis and interviews, this thesis examines the influence of several 
factors, such as international reputation, exclusion costs and close allies, on states’ 
compliance with the GCTF. 
 
Keywords: international organizations; compliance; counterterrorism; international 
reputation; exclusion costs; close allies; GCTF; Russia; Qatar 
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1. Introduction 
 ‘The Global Counterterrorism Forum will only become more important in the years ahead.’ 
These words were spoken by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs during a meeting of the 
Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), of which the Netherlands is currently co-chair with 
Morocco (Dutch Government, 2015). Initiated by the Americans in 2011, the GCTF is an 
informal, multilateral counterterrorism platform, designed to address the global threat of 
terrorism in a coordinated way with a focus on capacity building and good practices. 
Moreover, it aspires to promote a strategic, long-term approach to violent extremist ideologies 
(GCTF, 2017). According to a principal architect of the GCTF, ‘by the end of the decade 
following 9/11, it has become clear that the existing multilateral system to fight terrorism was 
not working; a dedicated, built-for-purpose global counterterrorism body was needed to fill 
the existing gap within international counterterrorism efforts’ (Rosand, 2016). Moreover, it is 
designed to expand counterterrorism cooperation beyond the usual Western, industrialized 
countries and beyond the military and intelligence communities. For that reason, the GCTF 
comprises 29 members from all continents, including the Permanent Five of the UN Security 
Council – US, UK, France, China and Russia - as well as several key Muslim majority 
countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Furthermore, the GCTF works extensively with 
non-GCTF members, ranging from Interpol to the African Union. Over the past couple of 
years, the GCTF has produced a large number of documents, good practices, 
recommendations and action plans, addressing a variety of counterterrorism topics, from 
foreign fighters to capacity building in the Horn of Africa (GCTF, 2017). Working groups are 
co-chaired by both Western and Muslim-majority countries, to stimulate mutual 
understanding. Hence, in the fight against Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq, a platform such 
as the GCTF seems more relevant and promising than ever. 
However, when taking a closer look at the founding members of the GCTF, it is 
puzzling to notice that its members include states with heavily opposing interests. First, while 
Western states such as the US aspire to fight extremist organizations as IS, it was revealed 
that GCTF-members Qatar and Saudi Arabia have provided IS with financial and logistic 
support (Wikileaks, 2014). Second, whereas the US and its allies fight the regime of Al-Assad 
in Syria, members Russia and Algeria publicly support this regime.   
These puzzling remarks raise the question of why would states comply with the GCTF 
norms in terms of counterterrorism, while they are simultaneously actively undermining 
them? Can the GCTF be effective with regard to the diffusion of norms in global 
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counterterrorism? How can International Organization theories account for the existence and 
impact of this informal, unidentified institutional body? 
Informal international organizations are increasingly becoming important in world 
politics (Vabulas & Snidal, 2013, p.194). Although this informal, multilateral organization 
has many members and has produced a variety of reports on best practices with regard to 
counterterrorism, very little is known about the influence of the GCTF in global politics. 
Additionally, while much research has been done to explain international cooperation in 
economic, environmental and human rights domains, little attention has been paid to 
multilateral efforts in the field of counterterrorism policies. This thesis aspires to examine 
whether theories that attempt to explain economic international cooperation can also account 
for cooperation in the domain of counterterrorism through the GCTF. It combines a variety of 
international variables, concerning elements such as international reputation, exclusion costs 
and close allies, to explain compliance by Russia and Qatar, states that directly undermine the 
GCTF-norms. In what follows, an overview of the existing literature on states’ compliance 
with international regimes is provided. Subsequently, the theoretical framework and 
hypotheses are presented. The next section addresses the operationalization and methodology. 
Finally, the empirics are presented, followed by a conclusion. It is argued that, whereas the 
variable of close allies cannot convincingly explain the compliance behavior of states, the 
variables of international reputation and exclusion costs are a present factor in states’ decision 
to comply with norms. 
 
2. Literature review 
For a long time, scholars of international relations have focused on explaining why 
international regimes emerge and why states decide to create or comply with them. In the 
field of international relations, international regimes are defined as a ‘set of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge’ (Krasner, 1982, p.185). Several schools of thought offer divergent 
explanations for the establishment of and compliance with international regimes. Some 
scholars claim that institutions do not make a difference. For example, the realist school 
argues that international regimes and institutions are of little interest, as states remain the 
principle actors. Compliance with international regimes or institutions is thus a reflection of 
power distribution and states’ interests. International organizations are designed by great 
powers and reflect the national interests of these great powers (Mearsheimer, 1995). 
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According to Mearsheimer, institutions only have a limited impact (1995, p.49). As they have 
no autonomy and are used as a tool by powerful states, international organizations do not play 
a role in world politics. However, this raises the question of why states, both weak and 
powerful, would then accept institutions at all. Realists, emphasizing a misplaced reliance on 
international regimes, do not consider the utility of international institutions.  
By contrast, neoliberal institutionalism claims that institutions do matter, even though 
states are aware that institutions restrict their freedom of action. Nevertheless, they suggest 
that states can mutually benefit from cooperation, as they assume that gains from cooperation 
are ‘absolute’. Institutions can provide certain advantages that help states overcome problems 
of collaboration and coordination (Keohane, 1982). To explain why states establish 
international organizations, Keohane focuses on the demand side. Liberal institutionalism 
perceives cheating as the main obstacle of international cooperation. According to Keohane 
institutions are able to solve this problem, because they reduce transaction costs and improve 
the quality of information provided to states (1982, p.339). Additionally, institutions facilitate 
side-payments among states, as they provide a platform, which brings negotiators together on 
a variety of issues (Keohane, 1982, p.340). Moreover, institutions can facilitate the operation 
of reciprocity (Keohane and Martin, 1995, p.42). Nonetheless, this fails to explain why 
weaker states choose to cooperate in organizations that leave them worse off, as Barnett and 
Finnemore (1999, p.701) mention that international organizations often produce undesirable 
outcomes. 
Whereas the scholars discussed above merely focus on international factors to explain 
the emergence of institutions, other scholars argue that domestic factors have to be taken into 
account as well. Drawing on liberal intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik argues that state 
behavior can be explained as a reflection of the rational actions of governments, which are 
constrained by domestic societal pressure and the strategic environment abroad (1993, p.474). 
Hence, international outcomes are the product of interactions between domestic groups and 
interstate negotiations. Dai (2005) also emphasizes the importance of domestic actors to 
explain international regimes. According to her, international agreements generate 
distributional consequences (Dai, 2005, p.363). These distributional consequences imply that 
some domestic actors within a state are able to gain from a government’s decision to comply 
with an international agreement, whereas others will lose (Dai, 2005, p.364). As government 
officials desire to stay in office, they have to gain political support and respond to the 
preferences of different societal groups (Dai, 2005, p.365). Hence, the decision to comply 
with international regimes derives from domestic interest groups.  
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In addition to the rationalist arguments of the scholars previously addressed, Abbott 
and Snidal (1998, p.6) claim that states accept institutions as it allows them to pursue their 
goals through the creation of collective goods and by solving coordination problems. 
Nevertheless, they recognize the constructivist approach that institutions are participants in 
social processes (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, p.8). The constructivist argument entails that states 
share principles about appropriate responses to a problem. Therefore, constructivists argue 
that international organizations are norm diffusers in the international system, teaching states 
their interests (Finnemore, 1996; Park, 2005). Consequently, institutions do not only matter 
because they reduce transaction costs or provide information: they contribute to ideas, norms 
and expectations as well (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, p.8). States accept, create and comply with 
institutions because it allows them to act as a community (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, p.24). 
Moreover, institutions help developing a community of norms and practices that define states; 
a function that Moravcsik and Keohane do not take into consideration. Constructivists thus 
focus on the role of international organizations in diffusing norms in the international system 
(Abbot and Snidal, 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).  
These theories have frequently been used to explain international cooperation in 
economic, environmental and human rights domains, but efforts to explain multilateral 
cooperation in the field of counterterrorism, such as the GCTF, are relatively new. Taking the 
existing literature on compliance with international regimes into account, classical realism 
fails to provide the conceptual tools to analyze compliance by both powerful and weak states, 
since they argue that institutions do not matter in world politics and are merely the reflection 
of powerful states’ interests. By contrast, the school of neoliberal institutionalism claims that 
institutions do matter, because they produce beneficial outcomes for states. Nevertheless, they 
seem to disregard that institutions sometimes produce undesirable outcomes, leaving states 
worse-off. Hence, a combination of international variables is used to sufficiently explain 
counterterrorism cooperation and the phenomenon of the GCTF. 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
This thesis adopts a rationalist approach, focusing on a combination of international variables 
to explain states’ compliance to GCTF-norms. Elements such as international reputation, 
exclusion costs and close allies are examined. 
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3.1 Hypotheses 
International reputation 
Several scholars link the membership of states to an international organization to states’ 
efforts to enhance their reputation. Simmons (2000) argues that states make decisions that 
strengthen their markets: because they worry about their markets, they are concerned about 
their reputation. A state wants to obtain a respectable reputation for compliance among states, 
because it expects that its market will profit from it (Simmons, 2000). Hence, a state will 
comply with an institution, when it receives reputational benefits. Noncompliance is costly, 
because it damages a state’s reputation. In addition, drawing on the credible commitment 
theory, Simmons and Danner (2010) claim that actors have difficulty reaching cooperative 
solutions in their mutual relationships, because they are not able to commit themselves 
credibly in advance to act in agreed ways. Hence, states run into the problem of cynical 
commitments: promises made by actors with no intention of living up to them (Simmons and 
Danner, 2010, p.232). Joining an institution is thus a form of self-binding commitment, as 
states attempt to persuade other actors that the government has committed itself to new 
standards of behavior. Finnemore and Sikkink agree, claiming that states that are insecure 
about their international status are expected to embrace international norms more thoroughly 
(1998, p.906). This results in the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: States are more likely to comply with GCTF-norms if these norms reinforce their 
international reputation 
 
Exclusion costs 
Medina de Souza (2015) argues that states sometimes comply with international regimes, 
even though they do not provide benefits at all: instead, they obtain absolute losses. He 
stresses what he describes as the ‘hidden dimension of institutional power’ (Medina de Souza, 
2015, p.158). Powerful actors reach an agreement first, because they have the ability to do it 
by themselves, which enables them to remove the option of the status quo from the set of 
choices of weaker states (Medina de Souza, 2015, p.160). Weaker states, to which a 
manipulated choice set is presented, can only choose from options that leave them worse-off. 
Weaker states can either decide to accept institutions or they can choose to be excluded 
(Medina de Souza, 2015, p.161). Hence, weaker states will accept international institutions 
because powerful states forced a choice between compliance and exclusion, while what they 
actually prefer is the status quo (Medina de Souza, 2015, p.157). In addition, Stone (2013, 
	 7	
p.125) claims that powerful countries have an advantage over weaker states in exerting 
informal power, as they have superior information, immediate access to personnel and greater 
cooperation with their requests. Moreover, powerful states can depend on deference from 
other states, which often prefer to avoid conflicts when their own key interests are not 
involved (Stone, 2013, p.125). The next hypothesis can be derived from these insights:   
 
H2: Weaker states are more likely to comply with GCTF-norms, even if these norms are 
opposed to their own interests, when the costs of exclusion are higher than those of 
compliance 
 
Close allies 
Moreover, scholars stress the importance of geostrategic considerations to explain states’ 
compliance. It is argued that geographic proximity plays an important role in motives to 
accept international institutions or comply with them, as globalization creates economic and 
political interdependence. Schimmelfennig (2006, p.51) claims that geography matters, 
because international interdependence increases with geographical proximity. Hence, member 
states are most interested in the policy interests of countries with whom they share a border or 
are in close proximity. Simmons also adds a geographical component to compliance, arguing 
that states comply with international norms if other states in their region comply as well 
(2000, p.819). Thus, reputation is clustered around regional principles of behavior (Simmons, 
2000, p.820). Next to the geographical factor, Coggins (2011) argues that friendship matters, 
as states coordinate their behavior with states with which they have a friendly or special 
relationship. Therefore, by focusing on a combination of the strength of relationships between 
close and proximate allies and their compliance behavior, the following hypothesis is 
presented:  
 
H3: States are more likely to comply with GCTF-norms, when their close allies also comply 
with these norms 
 
In the section that follows, the presented hypotheses and subsequent variables are 
operationalized in order to explain how these hypotheses are measured.  
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4. Operationalization 
Dependent variable 
The primary dependent variable in this study is the decision to comply with norms produced 
by the GCTF. This concerns the active, serious commitment of states to the memoranda and 
good practices produced by the GCTF and the reflection of these norms in their national 
policies. Hence, the compliance of states with GCTF-norms is demonstrated in their national 
policies and legislation.  
 
Independent variables 
International reputation, exclusion costs and close allies are the independent variables, which 
are derived from the hypotheses as presented in the theoretical framework. The following 
section addresses the operationalization of these independent variables.  
The first hypothesis focuses on international reputation. Downs and Jones (2002, 
p.96) argue that reputation concerns the degree to which a state is considered to be an 
honorable member of the international community and to which a state reliably upholds its 
international commitments. This refers to the extent to which a state receives reputational 
benefits. Evidence for this variable can be found in public statements by other states in the 
international community with regard to a certain state’s reputation and credibility, and in 
interviews with experts who attended GCTF-meetings. If powerful states publicly express 
their gratitude for states’ compliance, the hypothesis of international reputation can be 
confirmed. 
With regard to the second hypothesis of exclusion costs, it is important to define what 
is meant by ‘weak states’. This paper draws on the explanation provided by Simmons and 
Danner (2010, p.253), who refer to weak states as governments with characteristics such as 
weak accountability, weak democratic functions and a weak reputation for respecting the rule 
of law. The variable of exclusion costs is revealed by statements of powerful states such as 
the US with regard to international pressure to comply with GCTF-norms. Moreover, the 
costs of exclusion can be retrieved from interviews with experts that have participated in the 
process. This hypothesis can be confirmed if interviewees or documents refer to underlying, 
international pressure on weak states to comply.  
The third hypothesis is related to the role of close allies. According to 
Schimmelfennig (2001, p.49), national preferences largely mirror the geographic position of 
member states and their close allies. For that reason, this paper examines the relationship of 
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the analyzed states with neighboring and friendly countries. According to Digeser, 
‘friendship’ between states entails open communication, a willingness to share information 
and a sense of mutual trust (2009, p.338). Additionally, friendships between states are 
characterized by a common legal, religious or cultural heritage and understanding of the 
institutions they pursue (Digeser, 2009, p.339). The expectation is that a state acts in 
accordance with their close ally and will therefore score the same on the variable of 
compliance with GCTF-norms. Confirmation of this hypothesis entails focusing on the 
explicitly mentioned role of close allies in governmental public statements or news reports. 
 
5. Methodology 
Case selection 
This research focuses on the GCTF, analyzing why members comply with GCTF-norms in 
terms of counterterrorism, while simultaneously actively undermining them. Therefore, the 
object of study is a selection of members that undermine the GCTF, concerning Russia and 
Qatar. First, Russia undermines the GCTF by supporting the regime of Al Assad in Syria, 
which has been accused of using chemical weapons against its citizens (New York Times, 
2017). By contrast, other GCTF-members, including the US, strongly oppose this regime. 
After the chemical attack in Syria, UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson even publicly 
branded Bashar al-Assad as a terrorist (Telegraph, 2017). Second, Qatar directly and 
indirectly finances IS in Syria, whilst other GCTF-members fight IS (Wikileaks, 2014).  
 
Data analysis & generation 
As a method of analysis, this paper relies on process-tracing to track the process of 
compliance by members of the GCTF. The method of process-tracing allows to identify the 
intervening causal processes between an independent variable and the outcome of the 
dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005, p.206).  
This paper is a qualitative case study, based on a combination of documentary 
collection methods and semi-structured interviews. The evidence for this research is drawn 
from primary as well as secondary sources. Primary sources such as GCTF recommendation 
and policy reports, governmental reports and documents, speeches, press releases and public 
statements are used to discover the underlying motivation for acceptance of and compliance 
with the norms of the GCTF. Secondary sources include national newspapers, academic 
articles and policy reports. Secondary sources facilitate finding underlying arguments that are 
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not always explicitly stated by governmental actors. Moreover, to enrich the data collected 
through documents, semi-structured interviews are conducted with experts, embassy 
employees and representatives of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch National 
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) and the International Center for 
Counterterrorism (ICCT) that were involved with GCTF-meetings. Interviews can help 
uncover latent motivations for states to comply.  
 
6. Empirical section 
6.1 Compliance 
The primary dependent variable in this research concerns whether or not states comply with 
agreements and norms produced by the GCTF. This involves the active, serious commitment 
of states to the memoranda and good practices produced by the GCTF and the reflection of 
these norms in their national policies. To establish the extent to which Russia and Qatar 
comply with GCTF-norms, this research draws on the conclusions of the 2015 US Country 
Report on Terrorism, which evaluates states’ policies to combat terrorism. The results of 
Russia and Qatar’s compliance with GCTF-norms are reflected in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Compliance with GCTF by Russia and Qatar (US Department of State, 2015) 
GCTF Russia (5 out of 7) Qatar (6 out of 7) 
Prohibition on providing information and 
weapons to terrorists and terrorist 
organizations 
X X 
Criminalization of collaboration with 
organizations that commit a terrorist crime 
X X 
Criminalization of terrorism-linked cyber 
offenses 
X X 
Consistency of counterterrorism measures 
with international law 
- X 
Countering the financing of terrorism X - 
Adoption of legislation to counter violent 
extremism 
X X 
Financial support to GCTF-inspired 
institutions 
- X 
X = compliance 
- = noncompliance 
 
As table 1.1 demonstrates, Russia and Qatar are mostly compliant with the GCTF 
memoranda, but not fully. Russia uses its terrorism legislation to prosecute political 
opposition, thus not acting fully in accordance with international law (US Department of 
State, 2015). Moreover, in Qatar, individuals continue to serve as a source of financial support 
	 11	
for terrorists (US Department of State, 2015). Taking this into account, they have an overall-
score of compliance with the GCTF.  
Nevertheless, outside of the GCTF, both states actively undermine these norms as 
Russia supports Al-Assad’s regime in Syria, whereas Qatar financially supported terrorist 
organizations. The remainder of the empirical section addresses the variables of international 
reputation, exclusion costs and close allies to explain why, despite having opposing interests, 
Russia and Qatar still comply with the GCTF. 
 
6.2 International reputation 
Internationally, both Russia and Qatar have dubious reputations regarding counterterrorism. A 
state wants to obtain a respectable reputation for compliance among states (Simmons, 2000). 
Becoming a GCTF-member could offer those reputational benefits: GCTF-meetings give 
states the opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to counterterrorism. Although the 
GCTF presents itself as an informal, a-political platform for experts to discuss terrorism-
related issues, in reality, meetings do not always have an a-political character. According to 
interviewee 1, a Dutch expert who attended GCTF-meetings in Morocco in 2015, ‘very few 
people from the field participated in these meetings; they were mostly representatives of 
ministries. The meetings functioned as an opportunity to make political statements, or express 
gratitude to certain countries’ (Annex A). Consequently, GCTF-meetings present a chance for 
states to address the problem of cynical commitments, as it enables members to demonstrate 
their commitment to counterterrorism and present themselves as a respectable member of the 
international community. Hence, members can use the forum as a tool to add credibility to the 
commitments they make, simply by participating. Noncompliance is costly, because it 
damages a state’s reputation (Simmons, 2000, p.820). This section first addresses Qatar and 
Russia’s commitment to reliably uphold their commitments, before analyzing the extent to 
which they received reputational benefits through statements other GCTF-members. 
 
6.2.1 Russia 
Commitment 
As a major global player, Russia presents itself as a leading nation, ‘at the forefront of the 
fight against terrorism’, according to interviewee 2, the First Secretary of Political Affairs at 
the Russian Embassy in The Hague (Annex B). Putin’s 2015 annual state of the nation 
address underlined Russia’s leadership in the fight against terrorism (Sputnik News, 2015). 
Putin’s eagerness to take the lead in counterterrorism has been part of a broader strategy, as 
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Russia seeks to re-legitimize itself through counterterrorism. Putin has exclusively been 
framing Russia’s war in Chechnya as a terrorist threat, resulting in severe international 
criticism (Notte, 2016, p.60). Hence, when the US proclaimed the War on Terror against 
transnational Islamist terrorism after the events of 9/11, Putin seized the opportunity to 
change international perceptions of Russia’s conflict in Chechnya (Notte, 2016, p.60). 
Claiming that the terrorist threat from Chechnya was similar in nature to the universal terrorist 
threat of Al-Qaeda, Putin attempted to legitimize Russia’s war in Chechnya. This strategy 
entails that Russia’s support for the War on Terror would be regarded as fully consistent with 
Putin’s attempts to contain the rise of Islamist extremism and its spillover into Chechnya, thus 
legitimizing Russia’s actions (Notte, 2016, p.60). GCTF-membership fits well into this 
strategy of legitimation through counterterrorism, explained interviewee 3, an employee at the 
NCTV of the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice. ‘GCTF-membership gives Russia the 
chance to present the topic of foreign fighters in a broader context, demonstrating that each 
state has problems with that phenomenon, not just the Russians’ (Annex C).  
Nevertheless, when comparing Russia’s participation in the GCTF to that of other 
members, its leading role remains fairly limited: it is not actively engaged with GCTF-
inspired institutions, such as Hedayah, the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of 
Law (IIJ) and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). Many 
other GCTF-members are actively involved with these institutions as board members or 
through sponsorship. Furthermore, within the GCTF itself, Russia is not a working group 
leader or co-chair, nor does it seek to become one in the future (Interviewee 2, Annex B).  
Although Russia is not actively searching for a leading role within the GCTF, it still 
upholds the frame of a nation dedicated to counterterrorism. President Putin expressed his 
intentions to ‘engage in active, joint work in the GCTF’ in accordance with the principles of 
international law (Obama White House, 2013). Another statement was made jointly with the 
EU in 2014, declaring Russia’s commitment to intensify its cooperation with the EU in the 
UN framework and other multilateral forums, the GCTF in particular (Kremlin, 2014).  
In short, these statements reveal Russia’s aspirations to tackle the problem of credible 
commitments and re-legitimize its counterterrorism policies, by expressing its dedication to 
international counterterrorism efforts through the GCTF. The following section analyzes 
whether this commitment is recognized by other states and translated into reputational 
benefits. 
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Reputational benefits 
According to Simmons (2000), a state wants to obtain a respectable reputation for 
compliance, because it expects that it will profit from it. It is evident that Russia’s GCTF-
membership has contributed to Russia’s reputation. Despite the annexation of Crimea in 2014, 
a US report claimed that Russia nevertheless expressed a willingness to cooperate on 
counterterrorism issues, praising its participation in the GCTF (US Department of State, 
2015). Interviewee 3 acknowledged that Russia’s membership generates a certain credibility 
with regard to international cooperation on counterterrorism issues: ‘At least you will not be 
accused of a lack of willingness to participate’ (Annex C). 
The reputational benefits that Russia received, translated into material benefits as well. 
In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, US President Trump suggested that 
counterterrorism cooperation is reason enough to lift the sanctions imposed on Russia by the 
Obama Administration (The Wall Street Journal, 2017). According to Trump, ‘if Russia is 
helping us and committed, why would anybody have sanctions on somebody doing some 
really great things?’ (The Wall Street Journal, 2017). Although the US-Russian relationship 
was negatively affected by the US bombing of Syrian military bases following a poison 
attack, these sanctions were not re-imposed. Even though Trump stated that US-Russian 
relations were at an ‘all time low’ after the bombings, he quickly tweeted that ‘things will 
work out fine between the US and Russia’ (Reuters, 2017). ‘Trumps bromance with Putin is 
back on track,’ according to Adrienne Watson, deputy communications director at the 
Democratic National Committee, who argued that Trump has opted for a strategy of 
appeasement with regard to Russia (The Washington Post, 2017).  
In sum, Russia’s compliance with the GCTF generated credibility, thus enhancing its 
reputation. Moreover, the US has publicly and explicitly recognized Russia’s counterterrorism 
efforts. Taking these considerations into account, the first hypothesis can be confirmed for 
Russia, as it is likely that GCTF-membership contributed to Russia’s international reputation.  
 
6.2.2 Qatar 
Commitment 
For the Qatari government, directing the focus of attention away from the allegations of 
financing terrorism has become a priority, in order to improve Qatar’s international 
reputation. In the past years, Qatari officials have repeatedly denied any government 
involvement with the financial support of terrorist organizations. For instance, during a visit 
to Germany in 2014, the Qatari emir assured Chancellor Merkel that his country does not 
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provide financial aid to violent extremists: ‘Qatar has never supported and will never support 
terrorist organizations’ (Blanchard, 2014, p.7). Another example of public denial is the open 
letter written by the ambassador of Qatar to Canada, in which he highlights the measures 
Qatar has taken against terrorism. ‘These are not the policies and initiatives of a ‘state-
sponsor of terrorism’ […] These are the actions of a nation firmly committed to ending the 
terrorist threat around the world’ (The Star, 2017).  
In order to present a counter frame to the accusations of terrorist financing, Qatar is 
promoting itself as a country dedicated to counterterrorism. During a UN meeting, the 
Permanent Representative of Qatar considered counterterrorism a state priority (UN CTITF, 
2017). Additionally, Qatar’s emir emphasized his support for counterterrorism efforts, ‘within 
the framework of international legitimacy’, in a UN meeting (General Assembly of the United 
Nations, 2016). GCTF-membership has provided Qatar with the opportunity to prove its new 
commitment. It has expressed its dedication to the forum not only by becoming a member, but 
also by providing significant financial support, as Qatar pledged 5 million dollar to finance 
the GCTF fund (GCTF, 2013). Interviewee 4, an employee at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs responsible for GCTF meetings, confirmed that Qatar has repeatedly made 
considerable donations to the GCTF (Annex D).  
Nevertheless, Qatar’s commitment remains restricted compared to many other 
members, because it is currently not a working group leader or a co-chair. However, this is 
due to capacity problems, not a lack of will, explained interviewee 5, the Secretary of Political 
and Security Affairs at the Dutch embassy in Qatar (Annex E). Qatar has a small ministry and 
a limited staff, which makes it difficult to become a working group leader or co-chair. Instead, 
Qatar hosted a GCTF-meeting in 2014. ‘Hosting a meeting is relatively easy for Qatar, 
because that only requires money and a conference room,’ as explained by interviewee 5 
(Annex E). Hosting a GCTF-meeting gives Qatar the opportunity to attract international 
attention to its counterterrorism efforts. 
 
Reputational benefits 
Consequently, Qatar has been repeatedly demonstrating its commitment to GCTF-norms to 
enhance its international reputation. Projecting a positive image abroad has even become a 
national priority: its aspirations to positively influence its image internationally is reflected in 
the government’s key strategic documents: the Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-
2016. It describes Qatar’s ambitions to improve the country’s image (General Secretariat for 
Development Planning, 2011, p.210). This is of great importance, because despite the fact that 
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several other Gulf states have been accused of terrorist financing, much of the brunt of public 
criticism has been taken by Qatar (Dorsey, 2015, p.426). German Development Minister 
Mueller even claimed that Qatar was the ‘keyword’ when it comes to terrorist financing 
(Reuters, 2014).  
However, it is likely that Qatar’s counterterrorism efforts resulted in reputational 
benefits. In March 2014, the US Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence described Qatar as a ‘permissive’ terrorist financing jurisdiction’, but stressed 
that Qatar in other respects has been a constructive partner in counterterrorism (Blanchard, 
2014, p.7). Later that year, the improvement in credibility and appreciation of Qatar’s 
counterterrorism efforts became visible as US Ambassador to Qatar, Shell Smith, argued that 
Qatar’s efforts take on ‘increased importance’, as violent extremists are expanding their 
operations in Syria (US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2014). Shell Smith continued 
saying that the US government was grateful and confident that the Qatari’s have ‘the will to 
deliver on the commitments made’ (US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2014). The US 
thus perceived Qatar as a credible actor, dedicated to new standards of behavior. Another 
example can be retrieved from the 2015 US Country Report on Terrorism, declaring that ‘the 
US and Qatar have a strong partnership in the fight against terrorism’ (US Department of 
State, 2015).  
Finally, Germany publicly apologized to Qatar for Minister Muellers public 
allegations of terrorist financing. Chancellor Merkel stated that the emir of Qatar had 
reassured her that combatting IS ‘is much the task of Qatar as it is of other countries’, adding 
that she had no reason not to believe him (Reuters, 2014).  
In sum, Qatar’s compliance with counterterrorism norms are increasingly recognized 
and appreciated in public statements. Interviewee 1 stressed: ‘The very fact that Qatar is a 
member of the GCTF gives the country a certain international reputation, you cannot deny 
that’ (Annex A). Interviewee 4 even confirmed that within the GCTF, Qatar obtained the 
reputation of donating generously (Annex D). Considering that powerful states, including the 
US and Germany, have explicitly expressed their gratitude for Qatar’s compliance with the 
GCTF, the first hypothesis can be confirmed: it is likely that international reputation is a 
present factor in Qatar’s compliance.   
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6.3 Exclusion costs 
This section examines whether Russia and Qatar are more likely to comply with the GCTF, 
even if these norms are opposed to their own interests, when the costs of exclusions are higher 
than those of compliance. Both Russia and Qatar can be defined as a ‘weak state’, according 
to the definition of Simmons and Danner (2010, p.253), as their governments share 
characteristics of weak accountability, weak democratic functions and a weak reputation for 
respecting the rule of law. Because they are weaker states, they do not have enough power or 
leverage to set up an institution such as the GCTF, contrary to the US, which is a powerful 
state. Although the GCTF seems to be a costless organization with non-binding memoranda 
and no political costs, weaker states are nevertheless disadvantaged if they participate. Stone 
(2013, p.125) argues that powerful states have an advantage over weaker states in exerting 
informal power, because they possess superior information, immediate access to personnel 
and greater cooperation with their requests. Additionally, powerful states can rely on 
deference from other states, which often prefer to avoid conflicts when their own key interests 
are not involved (Stone, 2013, p.125). Hence, participation in an informal organization can 
impose political costs, despite its non-binding character. This paragraph explores whether 
Russia and Qatar prefer a status quo, a situation in which the GCTF does not exist, before 
addressing the exclusion costs, arguing that both states would be worse-off if they were 
excluded from the forum, due to international pressure. 
 
6.3.1 Russia 
Preference of status quo 
Even today, the American influence on the GCTF is obvious, according to interviewee 1, who 
described the forum as an ‘American party’. He claimed that the forum is merely a center for 
American lobbyists (Annex A). For that reason, interviewee 1 assumed that Russia has no 
interest in becoming actively involved within the GCTF (Annex A). This aversion against US 
domination within the forum is subtly reflected in a statement of the Russian Representative 
at the Ministerial meeting, advocating that members should not feel ‘antagonized’ when they 
interact with the ‘so-called coalition against IS they are not part of’ (GCTF, 2016). This refers 
to the US-led coalition, of which Russia is not a member. 
Instead of an American-dominated forum to address counterterrorism issues, Russia 
prefers a wide anti-terrorist coalition, advocating that it should be conducted under leadership 
of the UN instead of the US, ‘to avoid politicization and double standards’ (GCTF, 2016). 
Interviewee 2 referred to Putin’s proposal of a wide coalition to replace the US-led anti IS-
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coalition (Annex B). This initiative was not supported in the UN, ‘for obvious political 
reasons’ (Annex B). This means that Russia, unlike the US, is not powerful enough to set up 
an institution. Taking these considerations into account, it can be concluded that Russia 
prefers a situation in which the status quo continued, without the GCTF. 
 
Costs of exclusion 
Despite the fact that Russia prefers another institution to the GCTF, it nevertheless joined the 
US-led GCTF. This can be explained by exclusion costs; exclusion from this forum would be 
costlier than compliance. First, the GCTF lowers information costs. Interviewee 6, a program 
manager at the ICCT, argued that the GCTF is a platform that facilitates informal information 
exchange (Annex F). If Russia would be excluded, it would not be able to access the expertise 
produced by the forum, which interviewee 3 described as ‘the fear of missing out’ (Annex C). 
Russia perceives the GCTF as a useful platform for experts to discuss practical issues, despite 
considering the forum as a subsidiary structure to support UN activities (Interviewee 2, Annex 
B). Non-members cannot access the knowledge hub produced by the forum (Interviewee 4, 
Annex D). Since the GCTF lowers information costs, it is likely that the costs of exclusion 
become higher than those of compliance, because non-members do not have access to the 
knowledge produced in the meetings and will therefore be disadvantaged in combatting 
terrorist issues domestically. 
Second, a US-dominated forum threatens Russia’s influence over other regions, 
especially Middle Eastern countries, many of which are GCTF-members. During Putin’s 
presidency, Russian relations with Gulf States have remarkably improved. The Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states form an important market for Russian exports, as well as a 
source of investment for the Russian economy (Strategic Culture Foundation, 2016). In fact, 
Russia considers its influence in the Middle East as an important asset in its competition with 
the US (Mead, 2014, p.76). Putin vowed that Russia would always be a ‘reliable ally’ to the 
‘Islamic world’ (Kremlin, 2016). If Russia were to be excluded from the forum, the American 
influence on the Middle East would likely increase. Dmitri Trenin, director of Moscow’s 
Carnegie Center, emphasizes Putin’s aim to restore Russia as a global major power. ‘For him 
to be able to operate in the Middle East, in competition with the US, is a badge of being a 
major power’ (Carnegie Moscow Center, 2016). Allowing the US to be part of a global 
platform with Middle Eastern countries without Russia would disadvantage the Russians.  
Moreover, Russia does not want to risk its relations with China, which is also a GCTF-
member. Interviewee 3 pointed out: ‘What if China joins and the Russians do not? Then 
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Russia would take the risk that China bonds with the US and EU and suddenly forms a bloc 
within the United Nations’ (Annex C). All permanent members of the UN are included in the 
forum: hence, Russia cannot stay behind. 
In sum, it is likely that exclusion costs affect Russia’s decision to comply with the 
GCTF. Even though Russia prefers the status quo, exclusion from the GCTF is more costly 
than participation. The costs of participation remain considerably low, because the decisions 
are non-binding. Moreover, member states themselves can decide how much money they 
want to invest in initiatives (Interviewee 6, Annex F). Russia does not fund any of the GCTF-
inspired institutions. By contrast, the costs of exclusion are much higher: Russia risks its 
influential position in the Middle East, as well as possible rival alliances in the UN. Thus, 
regarding the underlying pressure of these costs for Russia to comply, this hypothesis can be 
confirmed: it is likely that exclusion costs played a role in Russia’s compliance behavior. 
 
6.3.2 Qatar 
Preference of status quo 
Despite presenting a balance of Western and Muslim majority countries, the GCTF offers 
predominantly western views on terrorism, because it is dominated by the Americans 
(Interviewee 5, Annex E). The Qatari government wanted to influence this: Mutlaq bin Majed 
al-Qahtani, the Qatari Foreign Minister’s special envoy on counter-terrorism and dispute’s 
settlements, has publicly warned against linking violence and terrorism with religion, beliefs 
and ideologies (Gulf Times, 2017).  
Interviewee 5 confided that the establishment of the GCTF led to concerns by Qatar 
about a Western focus on Islam-inspired terrorism (Annex E). Since the topics in the GCTF 
covered merely issues of terrorism related to Islam, Qatar was not completely satisfied with 
the GCTF’s focus. Hence, participating in a forum that portrays the Islam negatively is not 
Qatar’s preferential choice. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Qatar prefers the status 
quo, a situation in which the GCTF does not exist.  
 
Exclusion costs 
Nevertheless, being excluded from the forum could generate considerable costs for Qatar. The 
emirate is highly dependent on the US for its security, as Qatar is the host of nearly 10,000 
US military forces at its military facilities, including the regional headquarters for US Central 
Command (Katzman, 2016, p.13). The US and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation 
agreement since 1992: ever since, Qatari leaders view the US as the ‘guarantor of Gulf 
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security’ (Katzman, 2016, p.13). US Ambassador to Qatar, Shell Smith, referred to this 
agreement as the central pillar of US-Qatar partnership (US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, 2014). Consequently, with regard to military issues, the stakes for Qatar are 
extremely high. ‘If the Americans invite you to the GCTF, you will participate. It is an offer 
you cannot refuse,’ said interviewee 5, implying that there are considerable disadvantages if 
Qatar turned the offer down (Annex E). Since the GCTF is an American initiative, the 
Americans had the power to invite states to become a member. It is of vital importance to the 
Qatari government to maintain good relations with the US. Hence, even though Qatar was not 
supportive of this Western dominated forum, declining the offer could generate severe 
consequences.  
With regard to these considerations, the costs of exclusion for Qatar are high. Qatar 
could risk its military agreement with the US if it does not maintain a good relationship. By 
contrast, the costs of compliance remain relatively low, considering the wealth of Qatar and 
the fact that Qatar is not a working group leader or a co-chair. Thus, the costs of exclusion 
outweigh the costs of participation. Moreover, as interviewee 5 indicated international 
pressure by the Americans to comply, the second hypothesis can be confirmed: it is likely that 
exclusion costs are present in Qatar’s compliance behavior. 
 
6.4 Close allies 
The GCTF depicts itself as an a-political forum, as interviewee 4 claimed, employee at the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Annex D). Considering the fact that the Netherlands is 
currently co-chair of the GCTF, it is important to take into account that this is how the 
Netherlands would like to present the forum. Moreover, the notion that the GCTF is merely a 
forum where bridges are built, was rejected by interviewee 1, who attended meetings as a 
counterterrorism expert. He claims that the meetings create a sense of the West versus the 
rest: ‘Even during coffee breaks, participants only communicate with people from their own 
camps’ (Annex A). This implies that participation in GCTF-meetings facilitates coordinated 
behavior with close allies. According to Digeser (2009), close alliances entail open 
communication, the willingness to share information and mutual trust, as well as a common 
legal, religious or cultural heritage and understanding of the institutions they pursue. This 
section analyzes whether states are more likely to comply with the GCTF, if their close allies 
also comply with these norms.  
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6.4.1 Russia 
Currently, Russia is increasingly actively engaged with non-Western countries, cultivating 
several bilateral partnerships (The Carnegie Moscow Center, 2016). In Asia, Russia’s main 
partner is China, in the security, economic and political domain. Additionally, Russia has 
good relations with Japan, India, Pakistan, Algeria and Egypt, which are also GCTF-members 
(Welt, 2017, p.27). In particular, a special relationship consists between Russia, India and 
China, who form a trilateral forum for foreign policy and practical cooperation (Embassy of 
the Russian Federation in Washington DC, 2016).  
In recent history, India and China have expressed their support for the formation of a 
broad counter-terrorist front with a leading role for the United Nations, which was proposed 
by Russia in the General Assembly (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2016). Within the GCTF, China and Russia are becoming more vocal, expressing their 
statements more explicitly (interviewee 3, Annex C). Moreover, the Russian and Chinese 
security services are intensifying their cooperation in the domain of counterterrorism, which 
includes the exchange of intelligence information (Sputnik News, 2016). Hence, to a certain 
extent, it can be concluded that coordination of behavior is present among Russia’s partners 
within the GCTF.  
 Nevertheless, these partnerships cannot be classified as close alliances. Drawing on 
the definition of Digeser (2009), close alliances entail open communication and a sense of 
mutual trust. Apart from intelligence exchange with China, Russia is reluctant to share 
intelligence with other states (Carnegie Endowment, 2017). Moreover, according to Ying, 
China is not even interested in a formal alliance with Russia, nor does it want to form an anti-
US or anti-Western bloc (2016, p.97). Second, the role of Russia’s partners is not explicitly 
mentioned with regard to GCTF compliance. For that reason, there is no convincing evidence 
that the factor of close allies affects Russia’s decision of compliance. 
 
6.4.2 Qatar 
In recent years, Qatar is seeking to play the role of a diplomatic mediator in the region, which 
is reflected in their mediating role in Middle Eastern conflicts, such as Lebanon and Yemen. 
The Qatari government aspires to make Qatar a recognized ‘brand’ (Khatib, 2013, p.419). 
Part of this strategy is to embed itself within the international community as a key center for 
dialogue (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2015, p.710). This strategy avoids taking sides to 
maintain its position of neutrality. This essentially entails that Qatar closely coordinates its 
actions with its allies, but more importantly, it coordinates its behavior with its ‘enemies’.  
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Traditionally, Saudi Arabia played a leading role in conflicts across the Middle East. 
Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia’s mediating role has been weakened by a perceived lack of 
neutrality (Khatib, 2013, p.419). Qatar is currently seeking to fill the vacuum in the Arab 
world by presenting itself as an alternative to the Saudi Kingdom and as a potential new 
leader in the Middle East (Khatib, 2013, p.419). This is reflected in the Qatar National Vision 
2030, highlighting Qatar’s aim to improve its position and assume a larger leadership role 
within the international community (General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2011, 
p.210).  
In order to become a leader in the global community, Qatar has developed a delicate 
balancing strategy towards regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Western partners such as 
the US and the UK, ‘keeping its allies close and its enemies even closer’ (Cooper and 
Momani, 2011, p.114). With regard to regional allies, Qatar became a member of a military 
alliance of thirty-four Islamic states led by Saudi Arabia to fight terrorism (US Department of 
State, 2015). Interviewee 5 described Saudi Arabia as a ‘big brother’ to Qatar: ‘Even though 
they do not always get along, they are economically interdependent and share the same 
interests’ (Annex E). Saudi Arabia and Qatar thus closely coordinate their actions. Other Gulf 
States follow their lead, as Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar tend to copy each other’s behavior 
(Interviewee 5, Annex E).  
Additionally, within the GCTF, Turkey is one of Qatar’s closest allies, according to 
interviewee 5: ‘They are intensively cooperating in Syria, both support the Muslim 
Brotherhood and their security services closely work together on information exchange’ 
(Annex E). Turkey’s special relationship with Qatar becomes evident from a statement by the 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who stated that Turkey’s relationship with Qatar 
‘continues perfectly in every field’ (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). In 
fact, Turkey plans to establish a military base in Qatar to protect the country against external 
threats (Middle East Institute, 2016). Strengthening ties with Turkey is a strategy of Qatar to 
keep its options open with regard to the dominant Saudi position (Middle East Institute, 
2016). Hence, Turkey and Qatar’s relationship can be characterized as a close alliance. 
However, as previously mentioned, Qatar does not only take its allies into account: it 
also considers the position of its ‘frenemies’, the US in particular (Cooper and Momani 2011, 
p.114). The relationship between the US and Qatar can best be described as a strategic 
friendship. After the 1990-92 Gulf War, the US military bases were moved from Saudi Arabia 
to Qatar (Cooper and Momani, 2011, p.123). These military bases were of vital importance to 
American military objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq. After the invasion of Iraq, President 
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Bush made a statement on Qatar: ‘You made some promises to America and you kept your 
promises. We are honored to call you a friend’ (Cooper and Momani, 2011, p.123). 
Nevertheless, the definition of ‘friendship’ between the US and Qatar is disputable, as Boyce 
(2013, p.377) puts it: ‘The Americans find the Qatari the most challenging of their allies, 
never quite sure whether to bomb them or embrace them.’ When the GCTF was founded, the 
membership was allocated by the US, who wanted to include Muslim majority countries. 
Considering US’ military interests in Qatar, the emirate was a natural ally (Interviewee 5, 
Annex E).  
Another strategic partnership can be found in the UK. From the British side, UK 
Defense Secretary Fallon stated that Qatar is ‘one of the UK’s most important allies in the 
region’ in the fight against violent extremism (UK Government, 2016). Qatar’s prime minister 
made a similar statement on its relationship with the UK, arguing that ‘along our British 
allies, Qatar is a member of the GCTF’ (The Guardian, 2014). However, relying on the 
definition of Digeser (2009), they do not share the same legal, religious and cultural heritage, 
unlike Qatar’s Gulf allies. More importantly, they do not share a common understanding of 
the institutions they pursue, as some groups are considered to be terrorist organizations by the 
US and UK, whereas Qatar considers them to be legitimate Arab movements, such as Hamas 
(Katzman, 2016, p.15).  
In short, the hypothesis of close allies can be discarded for Qatar. First, the UK and 
US cannot be characterized as close allies of Qatar. Second, although there are indications 
that Qatar coordinated its compliance behavior with its close allies such as Turkey and the 
Gulf states, their role was not explicitly mentioned. Therefore, their influence on Qatar’s 
compliance cannot be confirmed. The overall findings of this section are summarized in table 
2:  
 
Table 2: Findings on hypotheses 
Hypotheses Russia Qatar 
H1: international reputation Confirmed Confirmed 
H2: exclusion costs Confirmed Confirmed 
H3: close allies Rejected Rejected 
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7. Conclusion 
This research has generated insights in the relatively new field of international 
counterterrorism cooperation. By addressing the question of why states comply with GCTF-
norms in terms of counterterrorism, despite simultaneously actively undermining them, it has 
explored the underresearched topic of the GCTF. First of all, the hypothesis of close allies 
cannot convincingly explain Qatar and Russia’s decision to comply with the GCTF. Both 
Russia and Qatar have not explicitly referred to the role of their close allies and therefore do 
not seem to have based their decision on the behavior of these allies. Another important 
implication of this analysis is that the variables of international reputation and exclusion costs 
are of high importance with regard to states’ compliance in the GCTF. The US and other 
states have publicly and explicitly expressed their gratitude for Russia and Qatar’s 
compliance, which contributed to the improvement of their international reputation. 
Furthermore, it is likely that exclusion costs affect Russia and Qatar’s compliance behavior, 
as exclusion from the GCTF imposes considerable risks. The central claim of this paper is 
therefore that states will comply with counterterrorism organizations when they expect that 
their international reputation will benefit from it and when they fear that the exclusion costs 
are higher than the costs of compliance.  
This research has demonstrated that theories that attempt to explain international 
cooperation in the economic, environmental and human rights domains can also account for 
cooperation in the field of counterterrorism policies. Therefore, some recommendations for 
further research include examining whether these variables could account for compliance with 
other informal institutions outside of the domain of counterterrorism as well. Additionally, in 
order to increase the generalization of these findings, the variables of international reputation 
and exclusion costs could be applied to other cases, similar to the GCTF. 
Moreover, this research has mainly focused on interviews with Dutch experts and 
Ministry staff, as the Netherlands is currently the co-chair. More interviews could be 
conducted with representatives of other GCTF-members, in order to obtain a more balanced 
perspective on GCTF compliance. Finally, due to language restrictions, I was not able to 
access Arabic or Russian documents or newspapers. Future research could also include these 
sources to expand the collection of data.  
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